In Defense of Plausibility: Ashcroft v. Iqbal and What the Plausibility Standard Really Means

Abstract

From one perspective, the Iqbal decision merely settled the debate about whether the standard established two years earlier in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly applies in every civil case. (Of course, that begs the question whether Twombly was a good decision in the first place.) From another perspective, Iqbal "messed up" the federal rules and effectively "abandon[ed] the liberal pleading rules which have prevailed for decades." Since the ruling, legal professionals have argued about whether the rules need to be changed and, if so, by what means. Additionally, members of Congress have proposed legislation to overrule the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 

Part II of this Note provides the general historical background that gave rise to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as the Supreme Court's treatment of pleading standards over the last half-century. Part III briefly presents the factual setting and procedural history for Ashcroft v. Iqbal. Part IV analyzes the two-pronged approach to the plausibility standard. Specifically, it covers how the Court distinguishes between facts and conclusions and how the Court determines whether pleadings contain a plausible claim of entitlement to relief. Part V discusses both sides to each of the four major criticisms of the Court's opinion: (A) that the plausibility standard raised pleading standards, harming plaintiffs; (B) that the Court did not have sufficient reason for adopting the plausibility standard; (C) that there are too many difficulties in the application of the plausibility standard; and (D) that the Court violated the rulemaking process. Part VI summarizes the impact of the decision on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. Part VII discusses Congress's proposed legislation and the problems with its members' attempt to overturn Ashcroft v. Iqbal. This Note concludes with the suggestion that the plausibility standard is nothing more than an explication of Rule 8(a)(2) and the long-standing procedure for dismissal where there is an insufficient pleading of fact.