Beyond the Executive Agreement: The Foreign Policy Preference Under Movsesian and the Return of the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power in Norton Simon

Abstract

The purpose of this Comment is to determine whether states in the twenty-first century have the power to enact laws which encourage and empower their citizens to press their rights. Part II of this Comment will summarize the methods by which a state law can be preempted when it affects foreign affairs. Part III traces the historical development of the foreign affairs power held by the Executive Branch and determines how states are affected when they enact regulations either within or outside their areas of traditional competence. Part IV examines the twin Ninth Circuit decisions, Movsesian and Norton Simon, in light of Supreme Court precedent. This Part also searches for limitations to the dormant foreign affairs power by drawing comparisons to limitations to the dormant Commerce Clause proposed by several Supreme Court justices. Part V considers the impact of Movsesian and Norton Simon, as they stand, on federalism and separation of powers. Part VI concludes this Comment.