Words "Which By Their Very Utterance Inflict Injury": The Evolving Treatment of Inherently Dangerous Speech in Free Speech Law and Theory

Abstract

In this Article, I wish to isolate for inspection Justice Murphy's suggestion that there are words "which by their very utterance inflict injury." Simultaneously, I wish to isolate Justice Murphy's theoretical justification that such words may be banished from society because such classes of expression are "of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." 

What makes Chaplinsky quite remarkable is the suggestion that there are occasions when words alone may inflict injury that society may redress without abridging the guarantees of the First Amendment, including injury to society's moral fabric. It is this more profound possibility, that expression may be regulated in the service of both order and morality, that continues to vex free speech doctrine and theory, and renders the ongoing interpretation of Chaplinsky worth serious investigation.