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Pepperdine Law Review

An Argument for Cadillacs Instead of Chevrolets: How the Legal System Can Facilitate the Needs of the TwiceExceptional Child

Kim Millman

 

Abstract

"The [Individuals with Disabilities] Act requires that the . . . schools provide the educational equivalent of a serviceable Chevrolet .. . [and] [a]ppellant, however, demands that the... school system provide a Cadillac . . . ." stated the Court in Doe v. Board of Education of Tullahoma City Schools. In so doing, the Tullahoma Court explained why the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), which benefits special needs children, was not applicable to the gifted yet disabled child. But why must a child be provided with either a Chevy or a Cadillac? Why can't the gifted disabled child be treated appropriately to his or her needs-both gifted and disabled?

Part II of this comment sets forth the history of federal education law, and the history and evolution of special education law and gifted education law. Part III defines and discusses the twice-exceptional child, including the educational experiences and legal dilemmas confronted by these children and their families. Part IV discusses the legal choices and approaches families of twice-exceptional children have in trying to best accommodate their children's educational needs. Part V concludes the comment.