Alabama v. Shelton: One Small Step for Man, One Very Small Step for the Sixth Amendment's Right to Counsel

Abstract

This sobering portrait of representation for a criminally accused appears even more ominous keeping in mind the dearth of qualified attorneys willing to represent indigent criminal defendants."' Underlying the many difficulties accompanying this sorrowful situation is a fundamental question that must be asked before attempting to solve this dilemma: when is an indigent defendant constitutionally entitled to court appointed counsel? There are certainly many important and legitimate concerns that attend the problem of ineffective assistance of counsel for the poor once they are at trial, but first these indigents must be granted the right to merely have a trial lawyer by their side. At what type of proceeding should indigent defendants be allowed to reap the benefits of court appointed counsel? What types of charges must be brought before they qualify for Sixth Amendment protection? Who is going to pay for these court appointed lawyers? More specifically, what type of criminal prosecution falls within the realm of "all criminal prosecutions" as stated by the Sixth Amendment, so that an indigent will be guaranteed a zealous advocate at the state's expense? The importance of a fair trial is held in the highest regard in the American justice system, and the necessity of a learned advocate on both sides is essential to this process. Therefore, at what point does the difficulty in providing legal assistance to indigent defendants outweigh the fundamental right to receive a fair trial? In many jurisdictions, eighty to ninety percent of those citizens charged with crimes are unable to afford private counsel. Given such depressing figures, a sound determination of this issue is even more imperative.

These are the questions that will be investigated in this article. Part II will discuss the landmark Supreme Court cases dealing with the right to counsel that lead up to the decision in Alabama v. Shelton. Special attention will be paid to the rationale behind these decisions, and the reasons for recognizing the importance of the Sixth Amendment's guarantees. Part III will discuss the Shelton decision itself and explore both the majority's and the dissent's detailed logic in drafting the opinions. Part IV will expand on the Court's recent departure from their prior Sixth Amendment jurisprudence and attempt to discover if the Shelton decision was enough to bring it back on track. Part V will focus on the current state of affairs in indigent criminal trials and the chorus of critical reviews accompanying it. This will include the contemporary effects of uncounseled misdemeanors and proposed solutions to the problem, as well as some criticisms of these recent proposals and evidence of their failure. Part VI will conclude with a difficult but "inescapable resolution," explaining why the Supreme Court must continue to move forward and give full force to the language of the Sixth Amendment. There are countless warning signals foretelling the dangers of a restricted Sixth Amendment right to counsel. A failure to heed these warnings will result in a mockery of the profession, a breakdown of justice, and a complete loss of faith in American criminal proceedings.