Traveling to The Hague in a Worn-Out Shoe

Abstract

American jurisdictional law is unique. Other nations-both in the civil and in the common law orbit-have national "long-arm statutes" that delineate the scope of general and specific jurisdiction. These foreign enactments enumerate, in a reasonably clear and concise fashion, the jurisdictional bases available for international litigation, while we rely on such vague and open-ended concepts as "minimum contacts" or "purposeful availment." Even more importantly, abroad, jurisdiction is not considered to be a constitutional matter.

We are the only country to leave jurisdiction to a motley array of (frequently poorly drafted and construed) state statutes, whose application to specific cases is subject to a vacillating and confused Supreme Court case law. These differences between our jurisdictional notions and those that prevail in the rest of the world are rooted in history.