Human "Wrongs"?: The U.S. Takes an Unpopular Stance in Opposing a Strong International Criminal Court, Gaining Unlikely Allies in the Process

Abstract

In July of 1998, the General Assembly of the United Nations, in the interest of human rights and a greater peace, made a decision which has the potential for making a lasting mark against tyranny, serious crimes against humanity, and the atrocities associated with war and armed conflict. The International Criminal Court (ICC) was intended to be, and will be, a forum designated to try war criminals of the worst degree: those who are accused of committing genocide, crimes against humanity, and the gravest of war crimes. The new tribunal was given life in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which also lays the foundation for its jurisdiction, its powers, its makeup, and the rules by which it will operate. In theory, of course, the ICC is a welcome addition to the world's arsenal to combat serious human rights violations. This ideal is backed by the overwhelming worldwide support for the ICC. Reportedly, as it became evident that the ICC would be voted in by the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly, the floor erupted into spontaneous cheers and applause. Its supporters have reveled in the story of success, encouraged by the overwhelming victory of its framers. By contrast, the United States has joined with a few unlikely allies in its opposition of the ICC. Ironically, allied with its traditional military foes Iraq, Syria, and Libya, the United States has opposed and attempted to undermine the ICC from the birth of its concept. As this Comment will explore in full, there seems to be no legitimate humanitarian justification for the United States' decision to oppose this tribunal. The United States has, historically, and to this day, continued to label itself as a protector of human rights and the leader of the free world. Although these facts contradict each other on their face, one must acknowledge that the United States has historically kept an air of determination to bring human rights violators to justice. The reason for this apparent discrepancy may best be explained by factors which have no real place in international humanitarian law: political closed-mindedness, nationalistic distrust of international law, and fear that U.S. nationals are committing grave violations of human rights and are thus particularly susceptible to prosecution by the ICC.

This Comment proposes to arrive at a reconciliation of the discrepancy suggested above. Section II provides a historical perspective to the creation of the ICC, outlining the justifications therefore and the United States' historical role in human rights law. Section III gives the reader the framework of the ICC, as derived from the Statute of the International Criminal Court and other materials. Section IV provides the United States' position on the ICC and illuminates the reader regarding the conflicts espoused by the Statute. Section V attempts to reconcile the conflict with a counter-point to the United States' position.